Reference Material

1984 Year End Safety Questionaire
(JAL Flight Crew Union)
The new aircraft B-767 is scheduled to be put in service in November 1985. Please indicate if you feel apprehensive over safety regarding the two man crew complement advocated by JAL management?

    83.89To responded YES
    5.89To responded NO
    10.797o gave no answer

Have you felt you have been aided or given an effective advice because you were on a three man crew complement aircraft?

Some of the comments were as follows:

  1. Misinterpretation of ATC instructions. (MANY)
  2. Forgetting an item on the checklist. (MANY)
  3. Forgetting to set the altimeter setting and descending further than cleared. (F/0)
  4. Extending the flaps with the speed brakes extended. (F/0)
  5. Checking the airport weather. (MANY)
  6. Engaging the PMS and Auto Throttle without engaging the Autopilot. (F/0)
  7. An engine thrust lever was locked in idle position requiring three engine operation until the CCB was recycled by the flight engineer. (F/0)
  8. Navigation aid frequency and course setting mistakes. (MANY)
  9. Monitoring the instruments during poor weather. (MANY)
  10. Mistaken flap settings, monitoring the engines during go around and forgetting procedures after landing. (MANY)
  11. Approaching the wrong runway at airports with parallel runways. (MANY)
  12. Trouble in the passenger cabin. (F/0)
  13. Averting serious consequences during approach in severe wind shear with cumulonimbus clouds overhead. (F/0)
  14. Forgetting to extend the gear during poor weather. (F/0)
  15. Communicated with the company during poor weather. (F/0)
  16. Appropriate advice during system malfunctions. (F/0)
  17. Wrong landing speed bug setting. (F/0)
  18. Checking the maximum cross wind limitations. (F/0)
  19. Completing a necessary procedure that had been forgotten on final approach. (F/0)
  20. Appropriate on time advice when a ADI malfunctioned shortly after takeoff. (F/E)
  21. Indicated a mistake altimeter setting on the millibar scale and inch scale. (F/E)
  22. Ezecuted necessary procedures when the oil system malfunctioned. (Capt)
  23. Checked the main doors when the door warning illuminated. (F/E)
  24. Appropriate monitoring during malfunctions (a difference between heaven and hell if required to conti.nue flight with serious malfunctions). (F/0)
  25. Pointing out the over looking of the Body Gear Arm Switch. (F/E)
  26. Almost landing without receiving landing clearance. (F/0)
  27. Three is the minimum number in maintaining cockpit democracy and the recalling of cardinal items. (F/0)
  28. The flight engineers role during diversion after holding was indispensable and could be counted on. (Capt)
  29. Almost taking off with the wrong nap setting. (F/E)
  30. Good advice concerning snow removal during heavy snow.
  31. Holding during bad weather on the INS, with the F/E inserting the coordinates, when the VOR and ADF malfunctioned. (F/E)
  32. Enabling the pilots to concentrate on flying the aircraft during a emergency. (Capt)
  33. During poor weather, the captain handled the communications, the copilot flew the aircraft while the flight engineer monitored the systems and shared in the workload by watching outside. This third pair of eyes was necessary for initial command training.
  34. A mistake in switch operation after landing between the body gear steering and anti-skid switch was made. (F/E)
  35. After landing, the flight engineer notified the pilots of the fact that the high speed turbine was continuing to turn at 80% due to the severage of the No. 1 engine thrust lever cable. (F/0)
  36. Turning to final at an unfamiliar airport, the flight engineer advised the pilots that they were 10 knots below speed. Both pilots had been looking for the runway.
  37. On a DC-8-62, the second officer advised the pilots that the flaps were set at 18 instead of 23.