5. PROBLEMS IN TEE PTF REPORT
The findings of the Presidential Task Force are as follows:
"Operation of the DC-9-80 by a crew of two is safe. Adding a third crew member would
not be justified in the interest of safety."
Thus they gave approval of the two man crew complement.
"As designed, the B-757, B-767, and A-310 potentially can be operated safety by a
crew of two. The addition of a third crew member would not be justified in the interest of
safety."
At the same time the PTF presented five recommendations relating to crew complement
certification and 13 other safetyielated recommendations to solve the present problem.
IFALPA (International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations), FEIA (Flight
Engineers'International Association), Euro Pilot, EFEO (EuropeanFlight
Engineers'Organization), FCUF-J (Flight Crew Union Federation of Japan), ALPA-J (Air Line
Pilots Association of Japan), and many other organizations world-wide voiced many opinions
and arguements in answer to the findings of the Presiderltial Task Force.
Below is a summarization of some of these opinions.
-PTF findings are not based on actual proof and are found to be inconsistent. (PTF
collected opinions at a public hearing but did not conduct ezperiments on its own with
either a simulator or an aircraft.) -No one on the committee had line pilot experience;
thus line flight problems presently confronting pilots could not be sufficiently under
stood.
-In a number of places in the report, findings are strongly influenced and present a
one-sided view of the situation.
-The findings are for situations and environments in the U.S. and at times are
inappropriate for other countries or are at times legally invalid in some countries.
-There is a concern that airlines and aircraft manufacturers are or will misuse the report
for their own goals.
-The PTF report is insufficient; further discussion is necessary. Proposals sould be made
to promote evaluation of airworthiness certifications with the participation of airline
pilots world-wide on an ICAO level.
-They are using the PTF for purposes other than the first proposed.
-They do not directly answer questions posed by pilots.
-The report would be false without the warnings appended to it.
-The question of whether a 2 man or 3 man crew is better was excluded.
-No matter how advanced the navigation system becomes, there is nothing to refute the
presence of the third crew member on board. A third crew member contributes to a higher
safety level at times of emergency, emergency escape, a pilots absence from his seat in
the cockpit, and crew incapacitation.
-The argument has deviated to whether two men can handle the operation or not: it's
impossible to find cause to fault the safety of a flight developed under the three man
crew complement philosophy. We will not approve reduction of personnel under the pretext
of technological advancement. The flight engineer's role becomes more and more important
as the need increases to suppot the total performance of the crew and to lighten the
workload of the pilots, particularly in view of the increase in the air traffic volume,
changes in the flight environment, necessity of coping with all weather conditions in
night and the added necessity of outside watching.
The Presidential Task Force met for only a short span of 120 days, leaving findings
made by persons inexperienced in actual airline work, and disbanded without answering the
arguments that were presented to them over the findings.
The PTF findings made the two-man crew complement of the B757 and B767 conclusive to the
manufacturers. Furthermore, the manufacturers are trying to use the resulting findings as
a foothold for the use of the two man crew complement in larger aircrafts such as the
B747-400 and MD-11.
| @ | 2-Member Crew a/ | 3-Member-Crew b/ |
|---|---|---|
| Total Accident Rate Per Million Depatures | 2.86 | 6.28 d/ |
| Crew-Rlated Accident Rate Per Million Depatures c/ | 1.46 | 1.73 |
| total Accident Rate Per Million Hours | 3.09 | 3.47 |
| Crew-Related Accident Rate Per Million Hours c/ | 1.58 | 0.96 |
a/ B737, DC-9, and BAC-111 b/ DC-8, DC-10, L-1011, B720, B707, B727, B737, and B747 c/ Using NTSB cause/ factor as crew-related d/ Includes B747 turbulence injuries
A close look at the chart reveals that the damage by turbulence (d/) is included in the three man crew complement accident rate. IFALPA has made a more detailed analysis of the FAA data (1977-1978) and points out that when turbulence and mechanical problems that are unrelated to the crew complement are omitted leaving only the crew caused accidents, one can see the accident rate per million flights for the three man crew complement is much lower than that of the two man crew.
The comparison between 3 Man Crew and 2 Man Crew, Crew Related Accidents during the 10 year period from 1967 to 1976 (202 accidents).
List of Recommendations MadeRecommendations Relating to Crew Complement Certification Although we have concluded that the procedures FAA followed in certifying the DC-9-80 for operation by a minimum crew of two were proper and represented the state-of-the-art at that time, we recommend that those procedures be improved and strengthened ln Several respects in preparation for future certifications. 1. Rapid developments in the field of digital avionics and flight control systems, and the attendant increased complexities of computer software, require that FAA have the breadth and depth of expertise to address these areas properly during aircraft certification. FAA should make appropriate additions to its staff for these purposes. In addition, we recommend that FAA develop specific procedures for addressing the impact of such new systems on the role of flight crew members, for certifying software, and for monitoring software configuration changes. 2. At present, the only generally accepted method for evaluating workload is task/timelline analysis based on comparison with previous aircraft designs. This technique, supplemented by improved subjective evaluation methods applied by qualified pilots, will offer the best means for demonstrating compliance with FAA crew complement criteria. We recommend that FAA incorporate such methods in the tests to be employed for the certification of the B-757 and B-767 aircraft. Studies of crew performance under a variety of conditions may provide additional methods for the assessment of crew complement in the future. Line operations (full-mission) simulation using selected line pilots could be used in conducting these studies. 3. Consultation with qualified line pilots has long proven to be beneficial and is incorporated to varying eztents by manufacturers in the aircraft design process. Several aspects of new aircraft certification, such as crew procedures, workload evaluation, and training requirements, would be enhanced by augmenting FAA certification teams with qualified line pilots, perhaps wol.king with FAA for a specified period. We recommend that FAA consider adopting such a procedure along the lines of the current procedure for using designated engineering representatives (DERs). 4. FAA should assign high priority to completing and keeping current Chapter 187 of FAA Order 8110.8 to provide formal guidelines for evaluating the effects of weather, ATC, and other system factors. 5. The minimum equipment list (MEL) identifies those items that may be inoperative when an aircraft is dispatched on a commercial flight (with appropriate operating restrictions). Recognizing that crew workload could be directly affected by the MEL, we recommend that the MEL be prepared, and related tests that examine combinations of failures be conducted, during the crew complement certification process as well as during the subsequent process relating to the development of air carriers'operating specifications. |
Other Safety-Related RecommendationsCrew complement, as noted earlier, is only one among many crewielated issues that have a bearing on aviation safety. On the basis of concerns expressed by flight crews and others; as well as our own observations, we consider these issues to be important in the interest of promoting flight safety. 1. The aircraft separation assurance program should receive FAA's highest priority, and efforts to improve the ATC system should be adequately and promptly funded. We are encouraged by recent FAA announcements regarding plans for the rapid implementa tion of collision avoidance systems. As ALPA and others have urged, we recommend that FAA examine the possibility of using the ATC Rader Beacon System (ATCRBS) in the initial implementation of these systems. Positive control of aircraft should be provided in all heavily traveled airspace and major terminal areas at the earliest possible time. Reliever airports and runways should be established in major terminal areas to provide appropriate separation between low-performance aircraft and jet transports. 2. To further increase the effectiveness of the ATC system, we recommend that FAA require all aircraft using heavily traveled airspace to be equipped with at least Mode C (altitude encoding) transponders. 3. Some form of vertical guidance, such as Visual Approach Slope Indicators, should be installed on all runways used by air carriers. Airports served by air carriers should also have instrument landing system (ILS) facilities. ILS and related ground support facilities should be upgraded to keep pace with advances in aircraft capability such as autoland. 4. Local noise abatement procedures in some cases require special flight maneuvers that could compromise safety. We recommend that FAA consider ways of standardizing procedures relating to these maneuvers with safety as the primary concern. Consideration Should also be given to exempting newer, quieter aircraft from noise abatement procedures that were designed for older aircraft types. 5. Improvements should be made in the provision of pre-flight weather briefings and timely and accurate in-flight weather information, particularly in terminal, areas. 6. Flight crews of whatever size should be relieved of and insulated from demands and distractions that do not relate to flying the aircraft. Some measures, such as prohibiting nonlflight-related cockpit conversations and communications during critical phases of flight, have been proposed. Potential distractions can be further reduced through the increased use of single transponder code assignments and automated communications devices, and through the establishment of direct communications links between the ground and passenger-cabin crews to deal with such matters as the personal needs of passengers. we also recommend further reduction of non-essential contacts between the passenger cabin and the cockpit. Cabin crews should be trained to deal with passenger problems and to operate cabin equipment without the assistance of flight crew members. 7. Although the incapacitation of a flight crew member is a rare occurrence, the airlines should uniformly establish programs to train crew members to recognize subtle incapacitation of a fellow crew member and to follow appropriate procedures in the event of such an emergency. we also recommend the further development and use of restraining devices that would prevent an incapacitated crew member from interfering with the flight controls during critical phases of flight. 8. We are impressed with efforts by air carriers to reduce the number of crew-related accidents by improving training in command, leadership, and cockpit resource management skills and by establishing line-oriented flight training (LOFT) programs. In addition, we recommend that airline pilots serving as second in command also be required to have an FAA airline transport pilot certificate with type ratings for the aircraft on which they serve. 9. Special attention should be directed to concerns expressed by some pilots over what they consider to be an excessively punitive approach by FAA in enforcing safety regulations. We recommend that ways be sought to instill and strengthen a sense of trust and cooperation between FAA and members of flight crews. In particular, we recommend that NASA's Aviation Safety Report ing System (ASRS) be strongly supported by FAA and NASA, and that serious consideration be given to strengthening the immunity provisions applicable to ASRS and to protecting aircrews from unwarranted disclosure of conversations recorded on cockpit voice recorders. 10. Many of the Federal Aviation Regulations (PARs) relating to flight crew responsibilities appear to be unnecessarily complex. An effort should be made to simplify and clarify the FARs to make them more understandable and easier to use. 11. Enroute, terminal area, and approach charts are frequently designed in a way that makes them difficult to use. The design and content of these charts should be improved. 12. The Secretary of Transportation should take steps to expedite the implementation of FAA's program (the Aviation Safety Analysis System Project) to strengthen its ability to collect; process, and disseminate safety-related information necessary for decisionmaking in FAA and the aviation industry generauy. The Aviation Safety Analysis System is being designed to be compatible with other accident data systems, including those maintained by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the International Civil Aviation Organization. It is essential that this system include worldwide data. 13 The research conducted by FAA, NASA, and the Department of Defense on the impact of
automation on the role of flight crews should be continued and expanded. We also recommend
that strong support be given to the development and evaluation of safety-related systems,
such as Cockpit Display of Traffic Information and Heads-up Displays, as well as to
ongoing research on the effects of fatigue, desynchronosis, and length of duty period on
flight crew performance. |